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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Mannakee v.
McCloskey, 63 S. W. 482, that the acceptance by a creditor
ACceptance
of a part of his debt in satisfaction of the whole
was without consideration, and therefore does
of Part of
not preclude him from recovering the residue,
Debt in
Satisfaction
of Whole

though he accepted as part payment of the

amount agreed to be paid by the settlement the
note of a third person. The court admits the rule that the
acceptance of the note of a third person for a less amount
than is due to be a good accord, but draws a distinction
because in this case the note is given not for the whole
amount compromised on, but for part thereof only-a somewhat questionable distinction.

ANIMALS.

Notwithstanding certain cases apparently leaning the other
way, the Supreme Court of Alabama holds in Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. Fitspatrick, 29 Southern, 859, that
Killing Dog
a dog is a species of property for the injury of
which an action at law may be maintained; and the owner
of a dog can maintain an action against a railroad company
and recover damages for the negligent killing of such dog.
Decisions protecting the rights of individuals in pet animals
are welcome, and we believe it is not too much to hope that
the old common law rule that a dog is not the subject of
larceny will soon be universally abandoned. The tendency
is undoubtedly in this direction, though some states still
hold out for the artificial rule of the common law. See note
to Haniby v. Samson (Iowa) 67 Am. St. Rep. 285.
654
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ATTORMWEY AND CIUENT.

In Fenwick v. Mitchell, 7o N. Y. Supp. 667, the New
York Supreme Court (Special Term, Kings County) holds
that where the parties to an action settle it out
Attorney's
Lien,
of court in good faith, but without the consent
Settlement
of the attorney of the plaintiff, the lien of the
by Parties
attorney on the cause of action (in New York
a statutory lien) is transferred to the amount agreed on in
settlement and may be enforced by a suit in equity. In such
suit the defendant is held not to be entitled to a jury trial,
it being purely a matter of equitable cognizance.

BILLS AND NOTES.

In Bank of Forsyth v. Davis, 38 S. E. 836, the Supreme
Court of Georgia holds that the payee of a negotiable promissory note who receives other notes from the
Collateral
Security,

maker as collateral security, may lawfully trans-

fer such collaterals to one to whom the former
assigns the principal note, and, if the assignee
wrongfully converts the collaterals to his own use, the payee
in the principal note will not be liable in trover for such
conversion. The only method the court intimates by which
the maker can guard against such transfer by the payee is by
letting his debt be evidenced by non-negotiable paper.
Conversion by
Assignee

A pledgee of a negotiable promissory note received the
proceeds of a collateral note and applied the same upon the
Collateral

debt secured by such collateral note, in ignorance

that the sum so received and applied was the proceeds of such note. He in no way altered his position by reason of such ignorance, but later sought to enforce the payment of the collateral note. The Supreme Court
of North Dakota in Second Nat Bank of Winona v. Spottiswood, 86 N. W. 359,1 holds that he cannot do so. The
question, the court says, is an anomalous one, and but one
case is found throwing light upon it: Coleman v. Jenkins,
78 Ga. 605.
Note,
Payment
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BUILDINGS.

Ordinarily where a man's land is overhung by a building
of his neighbor's, the foundations of which building are enProjecting
tirely on the neighbor's land, the former has an
Walls
adequate remedy in a mandatory injunction for
the removal. But in Crocker v. Manhattan Life Insurance
Co., 70 N. Y. Supp. 492, the New York Supreme Court
(Appellate Division, First Department), admitting this,
holds that where the cornice and upper wall of the defendant's sixteen-story building projected a few inches over the
plaintiff's building, doing little damage, while the removal
of the wall would cause great damage to the defendant and
to defendant's tenants, a judgment refusing an injunction
requring the removal of the wall and awarding plaintiff full
compensation in damages, with protection to plaintiff against
defendant's requiring a permanent right to encroach, is
proper. The encroachment was accidental and not intentional.

CARRIERS.

The exemption from liability for personal injury printed
on the back of railroad passes is familiar to travelers. In
Payne v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 6o N. E. 362,
Personal
Injuries,
the Appellate Court of Indiana holds that where
a passenger riding on such a pass was injured
Free Pass
through the negligence of a railroad company's enployes,
an answer in a suit for such injuries that by an express stipulation indorsed on the pass, the acceptance and use thereof
was a release of any injuries which might be sustained by
the person to whom it was issued, will not bar an action
brought by such passenger against the company for negligence.
The consignee of a car load of lumber failed to pay the
freight and remove it from the car within the time required
Stoppage in

by the rules of the road. The railroad company,

in consequence, stored the same in their sheds,
where it was held for two months for freight and storage
charges. At the end of that time the consignor notified the
railroad not to deliver the lumber. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts holds that he had a right so to do
since under the circumstances the transit, as a matter of law,
Transitu
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CARRIERS (Continued).

had not ended, since there was no delivery, actual or constructive, to the consignee; that therefore the consignor was
still entitled to exercise his right of stoppage in transit v.
Brewer Lumber Co. v. Boston & A. R. Co., 6o N. E. 548.

CONFUSION OF GOODS.

Where A. purchased logs of B. who had wrongfully cut
the same from C.'s land, and intentionally mixed them with
Innocent
other logs also sold to A., C., the Supreme Court
Purchaser
of Mississippi holds, is entitled to select from
all the logs so sold logs equal to those from the trees wrongfully cut from his land and to maintain replevin therefor:
Blodgett v. Seals, 29 Southern, 852. It matters not that A.
is an innocent purchaser for value.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In Bettnan v. Warwick, io8 Fed. 46, the United States
Supreme Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) holds unconstitutional the stamp tax imposed by the War
Tax on
Revenue Act of 1898 upon a bond required by
Functions
of Stae

-aovernment

a state from an officer as a prerequisite to the
exercise of the duties of his office. Such tax,

it is said, is in necessary legal effect, a tax upon
the officer's right to qualify, and upon the exercise by the
state of its governmental functions. The fact that the officer
is required to pay it before he has qualified is immaterial.

CORPORATIONS.

Against the dissent of three judges the Supreme Court of
California holds in Bassett v. Fairchild,64 Pac. io82, that
where a director of a corporation performed
Right to
compensation, services as its manager, not pertaining to his
Quorum
duties as director, he is entitled to recover the
reasonable value of such services, though no rate of compensation was fixed by the board of directors prior to the
performance of the services. The rule is also laid down that
no legal quorum of directors of a corporation is present
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CORPORATIONS (Continued).

when action is attempted to be taken on a matter as to which
one of the directors necessary to make the quorum is interested. As to this second proposition there is no dissent.
The receiver of a foreign corporation appointed by the
courts of a foreign jurisdiction, is entitled to maintain an
action for the recovery of realty in the possession
Foreign
Receivers
of a resident of the state, where no rights of resident creditors intervene: Small v. Smith (S. Dak.) 86 N.
W. 649. One judge dissents.

CONTEMPT.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming holds in Fisher v.
McDaniel, 64 Pac. 1O56, that the attempt to bribe witnesses
while attending a trial in which they are to
testify, which attempt occurs in the hallway of
Bribing
the court house or adjoining the building on the
Witnesses
outside, is punishable as a contempt occurring in the presence
of the court. Hence no jury is necessary, and it matters not
that such act is also an indictable offense.
CONTRACTS.

Where a church voted that the pastor be employed for a
certain term, the vote was not objectionable because passed
on Sunday, since an ecclesiastical corporation
can properly transact such business on that day:
Sunday
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Arthur v. Norfield ParishCongregationalChurch Soc., 49 Atl. 241.
In Veazey v. Allen, 70 N. Y. Supp. 457, it appeared that
the plaintiff had undertaken to procure the passage of a resolution which would result in congressional invesProcuring tigation of a certain corporation, so as to cause
Legislation,
Public Policy a depreciation in the value of its corporate securities. In consideration of this the defendants, certain stock brokers, were to speculate on their own
account in the shares of the investigated corporation for the
mutual profit of themselves and the plaintiff. This contract
the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds void as against public policy.
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CRIMINAL LAW.

A private detective falsely represented to a merchant that
he (the merchant) was being systematically robbed, and
Illegitimate

offered to detect the thief for a certain reward,

which the merchant agreed to pay for the detection and conviction of the thief. Thereupon
the detective through an agent, for the purpose of obtaining
the reward, induced an employe of the merchant to steal
certain articles of value. These were brought to the detective
and by him surrendered to the merchant. The value of the
articles stolen was such as to make the offence a misdemeanor
under the Georgia Code. Upon these facts the Supreme
Court of that state holds in Slaughterv. States, 38 S. E. 854,
that the detcetive and his agent are guilty of larceny equally
with the employe, all being principals, since the offence was
a misdemeanor. While, it is said, a detective when he has
ascertained that a conspiracy has been formed may join the
conspirators and go to the place where the crime is to be
committed for the sake of obtaining evidence, he may not
originate such conspiracy. Further in reply to the argument
that the detective intended from the start to return the goods
to the merchant, it is answered that "it is sufficient to constitute larceny] the property be taken and carried away with
the intent to appropriate any pecuniary right or interest
therein." Here the expectation of obtaining a reward rendered the intent to return the goods of no avail as a defence.
Method of

Detective

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.

In Stahler v. Philadelphia& R. Ry. Co., 49 Atl. 273, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that the right of
adult children to recover damages for the negli-

gent killing of their father who made them a
yearly allowance, is not aff cred by the fact of their inheriting his estate.
Damages

FELLOW-SERVANTS.

In Williams v. Southern Ry. Co., 38 S. E., 893, the Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that the doctrine that
Presumption a master is not liable for injuries to a servant
as to
caused by the negligence of a fellowt servant,
Existence
was not a part of the common law existing at
the date of our separation from England, and hence the
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FELLOW-SERVANTS (Continued).

courts of one state cannot presume that such rule exists in
another state, so as to throw on a plaintiff who has been
injured in such other state by the negligence of a fellow
servant the burden of proving that the rule has been abrogated by statute. The court points to Priestley v. Fowler,
3 M. & W. I (1837) as the earliest case applying the fellow
servant doctrine in England. Farrell v. Railroad, 4 Mtc.
49, decided shortly after, is probably the earliest case in
which the doctrine is stated in its present form and is said to
be the leading case on the subject.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

In Brinkley v. Brinkley, 39 S. E. 38, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina holds that where a man agreed to deed
Promise In
Consideration

of
Marrlage

land to a woman if she would marry him, and

after her promise to do so, but before marriage,
conveyed the land without consideration to his
children by a former wife, said conveyance,

though recorded before the marriage, was fraudulent and
void as against a deed made to the wife, to whom he had
promised it, sixteen years afterwards. One judge dissents,
and the prevailing and dissenting opinions present an interesting discussion of a close point in the law of fraudulent
conveyances.
Where a husband, fearing that alimony would be decreed
against him in a divorce suit, conveyed land on the underRecneyae standing that the grantee would sell the land for
his benefit, or reconvey it when he desired, a
recovery of the land by the husband will not be denied because of the intent with which it was conveyed, it not appearing that any alminony was decreed: Supreme Court of Texas
in Rivera v. White, 63 S. W. 125. The court proceeds on the
theory that it has not appeared that there is a creditor, and
that where there is no creditor there is no fraud. The
statute, it is pointed out, applies in this respect only to
debtors.
GIFTS.

A. had notes for money due her executed in the name of
certain relatives as payees, and gave them to B. who was her
agent in other matters, to keep safely and to
Delivery
deliver to the payees named therein, but without
any instruction as to the time of delivery. B. died and A.
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0IFTS (Continued).

gave the notes to C., who was also her agent in other matters,
to handle them as B, had. The payees named in the notes
did not know of them until after the death of A. They then
laid claim to them. But their claim was denied by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on the ground that the acts
of A. were not sufficient to constitute a delivery so as to make
the gift valid, It was also impossible to piece a trust out
of the fragments of the imperfect gift: Clapper v. Frederick,
49 Ati. 218,
HOmICIDE.

In Pennsylania it is held that before the jury can acquit
on the ground of insanity they must be satisfied by a prepohderance of evidence that the defendant was
Insanity,
Du process not responsible, The rule of the United States
Supreme Court requires acquittal if, from all the
bi Law
evidence, the jury has a reasonable doubt of defendant's
sanity: Davis v. U. S., I6o U. S. 469. In Commonwealth
v. Barner, 49 At 6o, the Stpreme Court of Pennsylvania
holds that disregarding the rule of the United States Supreme Court and applying its owni rule does not deprive the
defendant of his life or liberty without that due process of
law required by the Federal Constitution.
HUSBAND AND WIIE,

The separate acknowledgtnent by the wife still required
in Pennsylvania under the old Act of February 24, 177o
Separate
ment

(i Smith's Laws, p. 307) when she conveys her

to an
interest in real estate, is not necessary
agreement of separation to bar her right of
dower: In re Kaiser's Estate, 49 Atl. 79 (Pa. Supreme
Court).

Acknowledge-

This same court holds in Potter v. Fidelity Insurance,
Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 49 AtI. 86, that a wife whose
Debd of Trust husband, just prior to the marriage, and without
her knowledge, conveyed his property to a trusin
Anticipation
tee, to pay the income to him for life, and after
Of
his death to pay the property to persons named,
larriage
not including her, is not entitled to have the deed of trust set
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HUSBAND AND WIFE (Continued).

aside so that the management of the property may be restored to the husband, though after his death she may have
it annulled, so that she may take a share in the property.
Where a wife makes her husband her agent to deliver a
note signed by her and the husband, her name appearing
first, she is bound by the husband's representaHusband,
Wife's Agent tion to the payee that she was the principal in
to Deliver
the note, and cannot therefore escape liability by
Note
showing that she was surety merely: Court of
Appeals of Kentucky in Tompkins v. Triplett, 62 S. W.
1O21.
The husband, says the court, was acting "within the
apparent scope of his authority."
Dodds v. Winslow, 6o N. E. 458, holds that a devise to a
husband and wife of all the real property which the testatrix
Tenancy by should own at the time of her death, to have
Entireties
and to hold, share and share alike, absolutely
and in fee simple, conferred the property on the devisees as
tenants in common and did not create an estate by the entireties: The court (Appellate Court of Indiana) relies on the
words "share and share alike" to turn the scale. Percontra,
Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397.
INFANTS.

In Lansing v. iichigan Cent. R. Co., 86 N. W. 147, the
Supreme Court of Michigan holds that where an infant
compromise

injured in a railway collision executed a settle-

ment of her suit, in which no next friend or
guardian had been appointed, at the alleged
solicitation and by the fraudulent representations of her attorney, while she was a minor, such settlement was voidable
only. Hence she was not entitled to repudiate the same and
sue for her injuries before attaining her majority. As to the
cases in reference to this subject the court says: "An examination of these authorities shows a good deal of confusion in
the various decisions."
and
Settlement

A married infant contracted for the rent of a dwelling
house for a certain period, but he abandoned the same before
the expiration of such period. Held by the
Liability
on
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas that he cannot
Lease
be held liable for the rent for a longer time
that he actually used such house: Peck v. Cain, 63 S. 177,
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INVANTS (Contintied).

An infant, says the court, is liable only for necessaries actually delivered to him, and the non-user of the house is regarded as equivalent to a failure of delivery. He may
contract for articles which are necessaries, but he is not
compellable to receive and pay for them. So as to the rent of
a house.
INJURY TO BUSINESS.

A teacher of a high school wrote letters to the parents of
his pupils "containing a threat that if said pupils visited
plaintiff's store they would be suspended from
Dissuading
Persons
said high school." It was also averred that he did
Not to
this under instructions given him by the school
Trade
board, that such action was malicious and resulted in damage to the plaintiff. The Appellate Court of
Indiana refuses to sustain an action upon these facts, holding
in Guethler v. Altman, 6o N. E. 355, that a storekeeper has
no right of action against a school teacher and members of
a school board because of their maliciously dissuading pupils
by threats and otherwise not to trade with him; no dishonesty or anything of a reproachful nature being imputed
to him. The well-known English case of Allen v. Flood
[1898] App. Cas. I, is cited with approval and its principle
regarded as applicable.
INSURANCE.

A member of a mutual benefit association designated his
wife and sister as the beneficiaries in his certificate and on
his deathbed requested by letter that his wife be
Beneficial
Associations,
made the sole beneficiary.This letter was not
Association
received by the association until after the memBy-Laws
ber's death, when the letter was returned without any action thereon. The by-laws of the association prescribed the mode of changing the beneficiary of a certificate
by surrender of the certificate to the so-called camp-clerk by
the member, and a filling out by him of the surrender clause
thereon in the clerk's presence. Upon these facts the Supreme Court of Iowa holds that the change could only be
made in the mode provided by the by-laws and that hence the
change attempted in this case was ineffectual: Modern
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INSURANCE (Continued).

Woodmen of America v. Little, 8o N. W. 216. The mode
of change, says the court, has been made a matter of contract and can be altered only bya novation.

JOINT WRONGDOERS.

The owner of land is not a joint tort feasor, so as to be
liable to the lessee for the burying of a horse thereon by a
Owner of

third person; he having merely given such third

person permission to bury the horse there:
Fitzwater v. Fassett,49 AtI. 31o. The question arose because
the horse buried had an infectious disease, which in consequence of the burial, was communicated to cattle of the
lessee.
Land

LIMITATIONS.

Premises conveyed by warranty deed were at the time
in possession of a third party under a verbal agreement of
sale with a previous holder of the title. By
warranty
Deed, Breach subsequent litigation with the vendee's grantee,
a specific enforcement of this agreement was decreed. Under
these circumstances the Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in
Watson v. Heyn, 86 N. W. lO64, that the vendee's title
failed at the time of the rendition of this decree, and that
therefore the statute of limitations did -not begin to run
against action on the covenant of warranty till then.
Limitations against a suit for specific performance of an
oral agreement for the conveyance of land, the Appellate
Court of Indiana holds, do not begin to run until
Specific
Performance a demand for the deed or a repudiation of the
contract is made, when the person to whom the conveyance is
to be made is in possession under the contract, and has made
improvements: Horner v. Clark, 6o N. E. 732.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Omaha Savings
Bank v. Sineral, 86 N. W. 470, that a promissory note is
barred after five years (the statutory period in
Action on
Note
Nebraska) though the same is secured by a real
estate mortgage. While therefore it is admitted that the
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LIMITATIONS (Continued).

creditor still has recourse to the mortgage for the satisfaction of his debt, the statute of limitations, says the court, is a
complete defence to the recovery of a personal judgment
against a maker other than the mortgagor.
MANDAMUS.

Mandamus will not lie to compel a trial judge to sign a
bill of exceptions which he swears contains untrue stateTrial Judge ments, unless on the clearest and most conSigning Bill of vincing showing, made to appear properly beExceptions

fore the court, and incorporated in the record

sent to the supreme court: Supreme Court of Tennessee in
State v. Cooper, 64 S. W. 50. "It may be," says the court,
"that cases of hardship will arise, but this is an incident to
all human proceedings, and a different rule would lead to
much more serious complications and difficulties."

MORTGAGE.

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Jackson v. Longwell, 64 Fac. 991, that where a husband and wife had jointly
Foreclosure

executed a note and secured the same by a mort-

gage on real estate belonging to the wife, and the
note later became barred as to the wife by the statute of limitations, but not as to the husband (he having made payments
which tolled the statute) in such case the mortgage could be
foreclosed, and the wife's land sold to pay the judgment
rendered against the husband. "So long," says the court,
"as the statute does not bar a recovery on the note, it does
not a foreclosure of the mortgage."
Limitations

Against the dissent of three justices, the same court holds
in Mulvane v. Sedgley, 64 Pac. 1038, that when the relation
Assumption, of principal and surety existing between mortPrincipal
gagors and a purchaser of the mortgaged proand Surety
perty, who assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage, is recognized and accepted by the mortgagee,
and the cause of action against the purchaser or principal becomes barred by the statute of limitations, an action
against the mortgagors or surety on the notes and to foreclose the mortgage is also barred.
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MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.

Where at the close of the evidence each party moves for
the direction of a verdict, the court may discharge the jury,
and either decide the case at the trial, or direct
Effect,
Discharge of
Jury

that briefs be submitted and arguments heard

later, as though the trial had been without a
jury: New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Fourth Department) in Gitty v. Allen, 71 N. Y. Supp. 88.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

As the rule forbidding the recovery of municipal taxes
voluntarily paid applies also to street assessments, the Court
Assessments
Paid under
Mistake of
Law

of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Brands v. City

of Louisville, 63 S. W. 2, that property owners
who had under mistake of law paid assessments
for street repairs for which the city alone was
liable, cannot recover the amount from the city on the
ground that it was a debt of the city paid by its order to the
contractors. One judge, Judge Guffy, dissents.

NEGLIGENCE.

An interesting holding as to proximate cause appears in
Windeler v. Rush County FairAssn., 6o N. E. 954, where
Proximate
the facts showed that a fair association mainCause
taining an inclosed race track in its fair grounds
negligently made an opening into the track, and a runaway
horse escaped through the opening and injured the plaintiff
who was in the main part of the grounds. An Appellate
Court of Indiana holds that the negligent opening of the
fence and not the runaway was the approximate cause of
the injury. "It would be a thankless task," says the court,
"to endeavor to reconcile all the artificial reasoning and
expressions contained in all the cases dealing with the subject of proximate cause. A common-sense answer to the
question, 'what was the efficient cause,' satisfies the requirements of the law." But this affords one little aid in making
that common-sense answer. Justice Wiley dissents.
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NEGLIGENCB (Contiuned).

The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in Stewart
v. Southern Ry. Co., 39 S. E. 51, that where the plaintiff's
intestate seated himself on the end of a railroad
Sleeping as
tie while acting as a flagman and while asleep
Contributory thereon was struck by defendant's engine, the
whistle of which had been sounded and
the bell
rung, when the engineer discovered the deceased, and the
brakes applied, when it was seen that the deceased did not
move out of danger, a non-suit was properly granted, as
deceased was guilty as a matter of law of contributory negligence. A vigorous dissent is written by Justice Douglas,
regarding the conclusion as too violent a view of the possibility of the whistle and bell being sounded too late, and of
other facts which might disclose under the individual facts
of the case no negligence on the part of plaintiff's intestate.
PARZNT AND CHILD.

A father who permits his infant son to handle a loaded
gun, where from extreme youth or mental weakness or the
use of intoxicants, the boy is incompetent to be
Injury by
intrusted with a deadly weapon, is liable for
Child,
Father's
injury to another resulting therefrom, if he knew
Liability
the danger or should have known it in the exercise of ordinary care; Court of Appeals of Kentucky in
Meers v. McDowell, 62 S. W. 1013. In referring to the
cases cited in support of this position the court says: "They
rest upon the principle that in the use of firearms, which are
necessarily dangerous, all persons are bound to take care to
avoid injury to others in proportion to the probability of such
an injury."
PARTITION.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, tracing
briefly the history of partition holds in O'Brien v. Mahoney,
6o N. E. 493, that when the petitioner and the
Claim
Against
respondent were the only heirs to an estate of
Property
which the respondent was administrator, and
against which he had a claim greater than the total value of
the property, nevertheless the petitioner was entitled to partition pending the hearing of the claim, since as between
co-tenants, partition is a matter of right, and as creditor or
administrator the respondent had no right to object.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

PRACTICE.

Pennsylvania lawyers will be interested to note the case
of Van Sciver v. McPherson, 49 Atl. 74, in which the Supreme Court oR that state holds that the late
Statement
of Question
rule requiring a concise statement of the quesInvolved
tion involved in no case to exceed half a page,
is mandatory and its violation renders the appeal liable to
dismissal. This warning, the court says, is "intended to
admonish the profession that the rule will be strictly adhered
to and enforced."
RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in Perry v.
Western North CarolinaR. Co., 39 S. E. 27, that a railroad
leasing its road to another company is liable
Lease
for injuries caused by the lessee's negligence in
the operation of the road, in the absence of any evidence
showing a release from such liability. A common carrier, it
is said, chartered by the state assumes certain obligations to
the public of which it cannot absolve itself by its own act.
It is therefore primarily liable for all injuries caused by the
negligent management of its road.
RESULTING TRUSTS.

In Haney v. Legg, 30 Southern, 34, a rather familiar state
of facts appears. A husband purchased property in part
Inspection
Record

of

with funds belonging to his wife, and took the
deed in his own name. The Supreme Court of

Alabama, following the well-established rule, holds that to
the'extent of his wife's money so invested, a resulting
trust arose in her favor. The interesting point of the case
arises upon the question of laches, upon which the court holds
that the wife cannot be charged with negligence in not
inspecting the records of the conveyance for the purpose of
ascertaining to whom it was made.
SPFCIFIC PERFORMANCE.

A contract agreed that the claimants to the waters of a
certain stream should own and use them equally, one-third
Enforcement
Aga nt
Assignee

each, and that a party thereto violating the same
should pay the party injured the sum of one
thousand dollars. One-of the parties sold the

land to which the water right was appurtenant to B., who
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did not assume the obligations of the contract. The Supreme Court of Idaho holds that specific performance of the
contract cannot be decreed: Daly v. Josslyn, 65 Pac, 442,

STRXEET RAILROAPS.

With one judge dissenting, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey holds in Mayor, etc., of City of Newark v. State
Board of Taxatiol, 49 Atl, 525, that a street rail|nterost in
way company in that state had such an interest
Land
in the soil of the highways over which it passes as to be taxable as real estate., The dissenting judge, Judge Garrison,
thus states the difference between himself and the majority:
"The position taken by the opinion is that the trustee (the
municipal entity), by permitting one of the public to make a
special use- of the common right, parts with whatever legal
estate is necessary, to support such separate easement;
whereas my view is that the trustee permits such use aq part
of the administration of its trust, and to that end it must
retain its legal estate." It is interesting to compare on this
question a5 to the extent of a railroad's interest in the land
over which its tracks are laid, the recent Pennsylvania case
of Speese v, Schuylkill River East Side R. R, Co., 48 L. I,
382, io Dist, R, 5i5.
TRRUST$,
A testator devised his estate to certain trustees "to expend" in their discretion, and in such sums and at such times
as might seem to them advisable the "income"
Dscretion
of Trustees
thereof for the benefit of the poor in the state,
and for charitable and educational purposes therein, In
Haynes v, Carr, 49 Atl. 638, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire holds that under these circumstances the trustees
were vested with a discretion only as to details of executing the trust, and were not given the power to expend the
income or not, as they might chose. The indefiniteness of
the beneficiaries, and their consequent inability to enforce the
trust does not, the court decides, affect its validity, In such
cases, it is said, it is the duty of the public to enforce it
through the proper public officers.

